

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, Rhode Island

NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL: BRIDGING THE GAP

by

Antonio J. Morabito III  
Major, USMC

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Antonio J. Morabito III

5 February 2001

Professor T.L. Gatchel  
Commander E.J. Dahl, U.S. Navy

20010511 056

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: NWC Code 1C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (UNCLASSIFIED): NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL: BRIDGING THE GAP			
9. Personal Authors: Antonio J. Morabito III, USMC, <i>MAJOR</i>			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 5 February 2001	
12. Page Count: <i>23</i>		12A Paper Advisor (if any): CDR Michael Michaels	
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Alliance, CJTF, Coalition, Combined, Command, Control, Consultation, Interoperability, Multinational, NATO			
<p>15. Abstract:</p> <p>Probably the most difficult challenge facing CINCEUR in the area of combined operations is the compensation for inadequacies of the NATO structure for the effective command and control of U.S. forces. Frequently, CINCEUR is required to strike an uneasy balance between operational efficiency and political expediency in order to address and compensate for these inadequacies. Joint Task Force Noble Anvil represented CINCEUR's first attempt at compensating for the inadequacies of NATO command and control in an operational environment. Though ultimately successful, the establishment of a parallel national command structure proved flawed by violating various operational principles, and by developing into a political liability for the United States. Recent changes in NATO structure and operational doctrine pose increased challenges.</p> <p>CINCEUR must seriously consider developing a U.S. national command and control node designed for deployment within a NATO structure in order to address the inadequacies of the NATO command and control architecture. Only through the establishment of this command and control node, will CINCEUR adequately compensate for NATO inadequacies, provide effective command and control for American forces and maintain the political credibility necessary in combined operations.</p>			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified  X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

Security Classification of This Page Unclassified

## Abstract

### NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL: BRIDGING THE GAP

Probably the most difficult challenge facing CINCEUR in the area of combined operations is the compensation for inadequacies of the NATO structure for the effective command and control of U.S. forces. Frequently, CINCEUR is required to strike an uneasy balance between operational efficiency and political expediency in order to address and compensate for these inadequacies.

Joint Task Force Noble Anvil represented CINCEUR's first attempt at compensating of the inadequacies of NATO command and control in an operational environment. Though ultimately successful, the establishment of a parallel national command structure proved flawed by violating various operational principles, and by developing into a political liability for the United States. Recent changes in NATO structure and operational doctrine pose increased challenges.

CINCEUR must seriously consider developing a U.S. national command and control node designed for deployment within a NATO structure in order to address the inadequacies of the NATO command and control architecture. Only through the establishment of this command and control node, will CINCEUR adequately compensate for NATO inadequacies, provide effective command and control for American forces and maintain the political credibility necessary in combined operations.

## Introduction

Since its establishment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has provided the United States a fully integrated allied military structure within which it could deploy forces into Europe. Originally designed to organize allied forces for the collective defense of Western Europe, the NATO command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) architecture has relied heavily on parallel U.S. national C<sup>2</sup> architectures to fulfill various operational functions. It has been the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, United States European Command (USCINCEUR), "dual-hatted" as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), to ensure that these two C<sup>2</sup> architectures remain rational and complimentary.

However, to keep pace with the fundamental changes in European security that followed the Cold War, the Alliance now pursues additional peacetime missions. NATO's focus has shifted gradually from collective defense to collective security. In response to the new security priorities, NATO has implemented changes in the allied command configuration and force deployment doctrine.<sup>1</sup> These initiatives have presented CINCEUR with increased challenges in maintaining the compatibility of NATO and U.S. national C<sup>2</sup> structures.

Recent operations in Kosovo provided the first operational test of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> architecture. Unfortunately, the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure exhibited inadequacies when subjected to the rigors of expeditionary operations outside Alliance borders. NATO proved unable to provide an allied structure capable of satisfying the C<sup>2</sup> needs of American forces. The growing disparities between U.S. and allied technological capabilities indicate that this trend is unlikely to change in the near future. Therefore, in order to implement effective and efficient C<sup>2</sup> over American forces within a NATO structure, CINCEUR must establish a C<sup>2</sup>

mechanism to compensate for the inadequacies of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> architecture.

### **Command and Control and the NATO Challenge**

Operational command and control is “the means by which the commander synchronizes joint force activities in time, space and purpose in order to achieve functional component unity of effort.” The ability to integrate a joint force rests largely on operational command and control. Because it binds together all the other operational functions, operational C<sup>2</sup> is arguably the most important operational function for the joint force commander.<sup>2</sup> Unity of command is the most fundamental principle of warfare, and it is the single most difficult principle to gain in combined warfare.<sup>3</sup> The absence of a robust, coherent C<sup>2</sup> architecture can hinder the joint force commander’s ability to maximize the effectiveness of his forces.

In terms of allied C<sup>2</sup>, NATO is the most highly developed political and military organization in the history of the modern world. For more 50 years, member nations have encouraged equipment standardization, refined allied doctrinal concepts and conducted joint combined military exercises with the aim of developing an integrated multinational force. The highly codified, and relatively rigid, NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure is a product of these attempts at interoperability. Unfortunately, despite decades of effort, the allied militaries do not operate as seamlessly as needed for maximum efficiency in modern operational warfare.<sup>4</sup> These inadequacies are particularly evident in the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure.

From CINCEUR’s perspective, the NATO architecture is inadequate for the C<sup>2</sup> of American forces primarily because of disparities in allied staff officer technical expertise, organizational “holes” and perceived threats to U.S. operational security. The U.S. is clearly the most technologically advanced and best equipped of the allies. The disparities between

U.S. and allied capabilities, including precision strike, strategic mobility, strategic communications, information operations and intelligence, impede our ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with our NATO allies.<sup>5</sup> Many analysts believe that the United States has largely outstripped its allies in these areas, and some have argued that the problem is chiefly a question of funding.<sup>6</sup> Regardless, the disparities in allied capabilities has resulted in situations where only American staff officers are qualified to implement C<sup>2</sup> over certain American assets. Most allied officers assigned to NATO positions simply have not received the technical training or gained the institutional expertise required to effectively command and control specific American assets in military operations. The example of Operation Allied Force illustrates this point. Because few NATO allies can employ precision munitions<sup>7</sup>, few allied officers have acquired expertise with precision munitions planning. Consequently, American staff officers must conduct the planning for precision strikes in allied operations. For example, Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH), the operational command for Allied Force, “did have an in-place air operations cell and intelligence division which on paper should have been able to support an offensive air operation. However, it did not have the targeteering and analysis (expertise) required to support the task,”<sup>8</sup> and the United States ultimately shouldered the responsibility alone. The requirement for essentially national execution of potential NATO assets represents an inadequacy of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure.

Closely related to allied staff officer expertise, organizational “holes” in the NATO structure present CINCEUR with more C<sup>2</sup> challenges. In some areas, the allied organizational structure lacks planning directorates for operational activities deemed vital to U.S. commanders. Because of these omissions, American commanders are compelled to compensate for these shortfalls in an *ad hoc* fashion during military operations. Again,

experiences at AFSOUTH illustrate this point. Before and during Operation Allied Force, there were no established or trained information operations or psychological operations cells; the shortfalls were filled by *ad hoc* arrangements led by the American Maritime Operations Chief and another "U.S. expert" who did "pass through." Unfortunately, the "state of affairs at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was little better."<sup>9</sup> Clearly, the inadequacy of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure resulted in a haphazard approach to military operations.

Finally, perceived threats to American operational security deter American commanders from using the formal allied C<sup>2</sup> structure and signal another inadequacy of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure. Though a full member of the NATO Alliance, the United States maintains national prerogative over some sensitive operational capabilities. Intelligence, particularly targeting intelligence, is one such capability. "NATO has no intelligence capability other than that provided by individual nations."<sup>10</sup> The U.S. possesses the most sophisticated and enviable deep operations intelligence capability of any nation in the world, and even in allied operations, the U.S. is not always willing to share the sensitive sources of intelligence gathering or reveal the strengths and weaknesses of various collection means.<sup>11</sup> As one planner in AFSOUTH stated, "The real rub was the secrecy part... any targeting done in a fully allied atmosphere, even if heavily augmented by Americans, was at high risk for compromise."<sup>12</sup> The requirement to completely isolate U.S. planning functions from the allied planning structure indicates an inadequacy of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> architecture that CINCEUR must address in order to implement effective and efficient C<sup>2</sup>.

Some purists of NATO military operations contend that CINCEUR really should not focus on rationalizing the U.S. national and NATO C<sup>2</sup> structures, because national concerns

are secondary in combined operations. After all, the United States is a voluntary member of the NATO alliance and, as such, has an equal vote on all questions of alliance military doctrine and the conduct of military operations. Therefore, once the NATO Military Committee reaches consensus on the conduct of multinational operations, the U.S., and all other allied nations, should subordinate its national priorities to allied considerations. Only by fully adhering to the C<sup>2</sup> structures established by the Alliance will the United States demonstrate the commitment and resolve necessary for the success of multinational military operations. As General Klaus Naumann, the former chairman of NATO's Military Committee so delicately stated, "... [the U.S.] should prepare to think through to which degree they are really willing to transfer authority to NATO..."<sup>13</sup>

Though this argument has merit, it does not consider certain concerns of CINCEUR that demand a more rational association between U.S. national and NATO C<sup>2</sup>. First, "though deeply interrelated to the NATO command structure," U.S. forces in Europe "are not exclusively and automatically dedicated to NATO. The distinction is achieved through maintenance of two separate command structures," United States European Command (EUCOM) for U.S. forces, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for NATO commands. "Dual-hatted" U.S. commanders occupy key positions within the two structures.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, in a logical effort to "rationalize" the two command structures and enhance efficiency, CINCEUR must strive to solidify the quality of the links between the two C<sup>2</sup> architectures.

Second, the United States makes the "preponderant contribution to the NATO Alliance,"<sup>15</sup> in terms of personnel, materiel and funding. Realistically, by shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden, the United States deserves certain "special"



considerations. The sheer quantity of U.S. contribution entitles it to expect a greater influence in the C<sup>2</sup> structure.

Finally, according to U.S. law, the chain of command from the President to the lowest commander in the field remains inviolate.<sup>16</sup> CINCEUR, as the President's military representative in the European theater, has a legal responsibility over all U.S. military personnel regardless of their operational affiliation. For these reasons, it is clear that CINCEUR has standing, and that in order to implement effective and efficient C<sup>2</sup> over American forces within a NATO framework, CINCEUR must establish a C<sup>2</sup> mechanism to compensate for the inadequacies of the NATO C<sup>2</sup>.

### **U.S. Attempts at Bridging the Gap**

Operation Allied Force, NATO's first real combat operation, presented CINCEUR his first true challenge in compensating for the inadequacies of NATO C<sup>2</sup> in an operational environment. Joint Task Force (JTF) Noble Anvil, the American component of Operation Allied Force, was established as CINCEUR's attempt to bridge the gap between the C<sup>2</sup> requirements of deployed U.S. forces and the capabilities of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> architecture. Initially an amalgamation of two more limited joint task forces, JTF Noble Anvil's "principal role was to execute a limited strike option using Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles... and to execute a more extensive strike option if a limited strike did not achieve the desired end-state."<sup>17</sup> JTF Noble Anvil was initially designed to compensate for the inadequacies of NATO targeting C<sup>2</sup>, but it quickly grew to a full U.S. national JTF structure. Unfortunately, in the end, JTF Noble Anvil did little to simplify the multinational C<sup>2</sup> problem, and it actually magnified the complexity of the multinational operation.

First, by effectively duplicating the established allied command structure, JTF Noble

Anvil violated the operational principle of economy of force, or the judicious employment and distribution of forces.<sup>18</sup> The “idealized wiring diagrams and flow charts reflecting NATO’s command and control arrangements, and its associated staff procedures, had rapidly been thrown aside under the pressures of a real operation.”<sup>19</sup> Essentially, the established NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure, the product of more than fifty year’s refinement, had been marginalized in its first operational test. The establishment of a full national JTF duplicated allied efforts and resulted in an inefficient use of CINCEUR’s assigned forces.

Second, the establishment of a U.S. national JTF violated the principle of unity of command. U.S. joint doctrine describes unity of command as the operation of all forces “under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.” In multinational operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.<sup>20</sup> By establishing parallel C<sup>2</sup> structures, JTF Noble Anvil clearly allied undermined unity of command. GEN Wesley Clark, the architect of the Allied Force C<sup>2</sup> structure, admitted that the parallel national and NATO C<sup>2</sup> organizations represented, “about as complex a command and control structure as anyone would fear to see”<sup>21</sup> Indeed, after hostilities ended, an allied leader remarked, “From a NATO point of view, one has to make sure that a NATO commander is given the maximum unity of command and the right to see it through.”<sup>22</sup>

Finally, and probably most importantly in a multinational context, JTF Noble Anvil became a political liability for the United States from the perspective of its allies. As a full member of the NATO Alliance, the United States is free to participate in the Alliance decision-making process, and it is bound by those decisions once finalized. The establishment of a parallel national C<sup>2</sup> structure for a NATO military operation conveyed a

perception of lack of commitment to established NATO procedures and structures. The French were quick to point out that though there was a "recognized need for a single command, it has to be admitted that part of the military operation was conducted by the United States outside the strict NATO framework and procedures." The British, usually a good deal more charitable, claimed the "efforts to blend the US Joint Task Force Noble Anvil operation into the Allied campaign appear to have been at times clumsy and inappropriate."<sup>23</sup> LtGen Michael Short, Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander (CJFACC) for Operation Allied Force, bluntly described the establishment of a national JTF headquarters as "incredibly arrogant."<sup>24</sup>

Both the U.S. and NATO are quick to hail Operation Allied Force as an "overwhelming success," and "a turning point in NATO's long and successful history."<sup>25</sup> Considering the limitations of allied C<sup>2</sup>, JTF Noble Anvil clearly contributed to that success. However, one may argue that CINCEUR's solution to the rationalization of U.S. national and NATO C<sup>2</sup> bought operational efficiency at the expense of political viability.

Some allies insist "there are (still) questions about the nature and quality of the links between U.S. and NATO command structures."<sup>26</sup> The U.S. Department of Defense reported to Congress that "NATO's command structure worked well, but parallel U.S. and NATO command-and-control structures complicated operational planning and unity of command." The document later admits that future work is needed to "develop an overarching command and control policy and agree on procedures for policy's implementation."<sup>27</sup> Clearly, in order to compensate for future inadequacies of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure and still maximize the benefits of multinational support, CINCEUR will have to develop a mechanism that is both operationally effective and politically sound.

## **NATO's New Face and New Challenges**

From the perspective of CINCEUR, Operation Allied Force represented the best potential scenario in terms of simplified allied C<sup>2</sup>, because most commanders in the chain of command were American. Clearly, this may not always be the case. Recent changes and proposed innovations in the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure will do little to bridge the gulf between the U.S. and NATO C<sup>2</sup> structures, and in some cases, the proposed NATO initiatives will only compound the C<sup>2</sup> problems for CINCEUR. The principal challenges facing CINCEUR are compensating for limitations imposed by the new allied staffing structure and incorporating the NATO Combined JTF (CJTF) concept.

The new allied manning structure was a product of summit meetings in the early 1990's where NATO leaders made decisions aimed at implementing changes to meet Europe's emerging security concerns. The first major initiative involved increasing European representation on higher NATO staffs and in senior NATO billets. The Shaefer Plan of 1993 made significant changes in many senior NATO command positions; many posts historically occupied by Americans were either eliminated or re-designated European positions.<sup>28</sup> From the perspective of CINCEUR, the inadequacies of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure, manifested in lack of allied officer expertise, have been compounded by the decreased participation of American staff officers in key positions on senior NATO staffs.

The combined joint task force (CJTF) is NATO's most significant recent doctrinal innovation. NATO defines the CJTF as a "multinational, multi-service deployable task force generated and tailored primarily... for military operations not involving the defense of Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping." The principal purpose of the CJTF is to "provide the Alliance with flexible and efficient means to generate, at short

notice, rapidly deployable... forces, with dedicated command and control capability.”<sup>29</sup> The CJTF is likely to be NATO’s preferred organizational C<sup>2</sup> structure for future operations, and though the NATO CJTF theoretically enhances NATO’s ability to respond to crises, it will do little to compensate for the inadequacies of the current C<sup>2</sup> structure.

First, the NATO CJTF does not address the current NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure inadequacies in allied staff officer expertise. NATO has not established an official structure for the CJTF, but draft plans indicate that it will be designed around some form of nucleus element. When ordered, the nucleus will be activated from an existing NATO headquarters based on the geographic location and specific mission of the operation.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the nucleus staff will be drawn from the current pool of allied staff officers, and the majority of the allied officers that compose the nucleus staff will possess no more of the specialized training or experience than current staffs. Though the NATO CJTF provides a new vehicle for deploying NATO staffs to contingency operations, it does not compensate for basic inadequacies of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure.

Second, though the CJTF theoretically addresses the problem of organizational “holes,” it has no solid solution for compensating for these “holes.” The NATO CJTF concept states that after immediate deployment, this staff nucleus will be augmented with added staff modules to complete the capabilities of the CJTF.<sup>31</sup> The concept of modular augmentation seems to address the problem of organizational “holes.” “Modules in theory would provide a core of trained personnel within a certain discipline—such as logistics, intelligence or medical support—that could ‘hit the ground running’ with minimum train-up required.”<sup>32</sup> However, the modular concept has its detractors. First, it is “an article of faith that nations will agree *in advance* to fill a CJTF staff” module “without knowing the type,

location and duration of the mission... another pitfall is whether the CJTF commander will actually receive the promised augmentation."<sup>33</sup> Even if a nation did agree in advance to fill a specific module, for example, for information operations, there is no guarantee that in our resource constrained environment that national interests would not override the NATO commitment.<sup>34</sup> Clearly, it would be risky for CINCEUR to rely on the NATO CJTF to compensate for the inadequacies of the current NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure.

Finally, the NATO CJTF may only heighten concerns of threats to U.S. operational security. One of the cornerstone concepts of the CJTF initiative is to "facilitate operations with non-NATO nations such as the [Partnership for Peace] (PfP)."<sup>35</sup> The PfP is composed of nations who desire greater interoperability with the Alliance, but currently do not share allied status. Though the PfP are not formally part of NATO, they frequently participate in exercises, and, under the CJTF concept, they can potentially deploy on NATO operations. Because the PfP are not formally integrated into the Alliance, they are not permitted free access to NATO intelligence; however, because of sheer proximity, the inclusion of PfP in NATO CJTF deployments will increase the possibility of breeches of U.S. national operational security. It is clear that the NATO CJTF will not adequately address to inadequacies of the current NATO C<sup>2</sup>, and CINCEUR must establish a C<sup>2</sup> mechanism in order to implement effective and efficient C<sup>2</sup> over American forces within a NATO structure.

Apologists for the NATO CJTF claim that it is unfair to harshly critique the concept this early in its development. Indeed, NATO advertises that, as a credible fighting force, the NATO CJTF will not be fully operational capable (FOC) until the year 2004. Exercises such as Strong Resolve '98, they contend, were incorrectly advertised as trials for the CJTF concept, and that though successful, they gave the false impression that the NATO CJTF

structure was a validated and viable warfighting structure.

It is true that the NATO Military Committee has not yet fully approved the draft policy on the CJTF capability. However, it seems likely that NATO will move forward with implementing its CJTF concept; as an allied C<sup>2</sup> architecture, it is the wave of the future. Even if the CJTF could address the inadequacies of staff officer expertise, organizational “holes” and threats to operational security, solutions would take years to fully implement through modifications of doctrine and subsequent training. CINCEUR must anticipate the inevitable inadequacies of the NATO CJTF and plan to compensate for those inadequacies before any real contingency operation.

The question remains: how should CINCEUR compensate for the inadequacies of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure? It seems that CINCEUR must establish a C<sup>2</sup> node internal to the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure in order to compensate for its inadequacies and provide effective and efficient C<sup>2</sup> for American forces within a NATO structure.

#### **The CINCEUR Modular C<sup>2</sup> Node**

CINCEUR's solution to the inadequacies of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure might be encapsulated in the age-old dictum, “if you can't beat 'em, join 'em.” That is, instead of focusing on a politically damaging external solution for compensating for the inadequacies of the NATO C<sup>2</sup> structure, CINCEUR should explore the feasibility of establishing a self-contained U.S. national C<sup>2</sup> organization for deployment *within* a NATO CJTF architecture; CINCEUR should establish a U.S. national C<sup>2</sup> modular node. The principal attraction to this option is that it affords CINCEUR the ability to establish effective C<sup>2</sup> of American forces in the NATO structure without incurring the political liabilities associated with a full national JTF.

By establishing his own C<sup>2</sup> node, CINCEUR would have the freedom to man, train and equip a fundamentally "NATO" organization that conforms solely to U.S. standards. U.S. Joint Doctrine identifies the five components of a command and control "node" as personnel, equipment, procedures, communications and facilities;<sup>36</sup> CINCEUR must design a rapidly deployable node considering each element.

By maintaining a U.S. national C<sup>2</sup> node, CINCEUR can guarantee the manpower necessary for the C<sup>2</sup> of American forces. Clearly, any C<sup>2</sup> node should be scalable in order to meet the requirements of specific JTF missions. However, by maintaining a purely national node, CINCEUR can ensure that a body of personnel with the requisite technical expertise and experience is permanently on hand for operational deployments with NATO. Instead of relying on vagaries of allied manpower sourcing, CINCEUR can predetermine and designate personnel well in advance of any contingency. Though CINCEUR would undoubtedly source these personnel through his own joint staff or subordinate commands, this solution would certainly require less manpower than a parallel standing U.S. national JTF.

Procedurally, by establishing his own C<sup>2</sup> node, CINCEUR can ensure that its members are instructed and exercised in national and NATO doctrine well before deployment. The maintenance of a U.S. national C<sup>2</sup> node will guarantee CINCEUR the requisite expertise for the C<sup>2</sup> of American forces in NATO operations. Members, likely identified beforehand by billet, should be trained in U.S. and NATO doctrine and procedures to CINCEUR's standard. This pool of expertise is the cornerstone of this concept, as it enables CINCEUR a standing mechanism for bridging the NATO and national C<sup>2</sup> gap.

In terms of equipment and communications, the establishment of a U.S. C<sup>2</sup> node will ensure that personnel deployed for the C<sup>2</sup> of American forces are equipped with the best



communications and equipment available. Recent analyses of the NATO CJTF demonstrate that any multinational deployments today would immediately run into equipment sourcing and compatibility problems. The problems could be solved, "but the solution could be cost prohibitive."<sup>37</sup> CINCEUR could outfit his U.S. national C<sup>2</sup> node with best possible national and NATO communications and equipment and preclude staff reliance on the ponderous NATO equipment procurement process.

Finally, physically placing the node would be another prerogative of CINCEUR, and the key to maintaining operational security. It seems logical that the U.S. national C<sup>2</sup> node be assigned for service near the CJTF CJ-5, because proximity will allow necessary liaison with like NATO planners. However, while facilitating liaison with NATO counterparts, the exclusive national nature of the modular C<sup>2</sup> node would ensure higher levels of operational security. Therefore, CINCEUR will be able to ensure operational security even on deployments including PfP and other non-allied.

In addition to the stated operational benefits, there are numerous advantages to establishing a standing American C<sup>2</sup> node for service within the NATO CJTF structure. First the establishment of a standing American C<sup>2</sup> node for service in multinational operations would likely prompt less resistance in national and NATO approval bodies, because it already conforms to both U.S. joint doctrine and the NATO CJTF concept. Current U.S. joint doctrine recognizes that "regardless of how" a multinational force may be "organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component to ensure effective administration of its force." Usually termed a National Support Element (NSE), the component provides a "means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender military views and recommendations

directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations.”<sup>38</sup> In reality, current NSEs act as little more than administrative support organizations; CINCEUR’s modular C<sup>2</sup> node could provide increased operational support while maintaining the traditional NSE label. As a complimentary concept, NATO recommends that to address staff shortfalls in the CJTF concept, sending organizations should use a modular approach. In order to ensure cohesion and reduce training and exercise requirements nations are encouraged to deploy highly ready, self-contained modules that offer specific staff support capabilities. The concept recognizes its manning inadequacies, and allows single source modules to “bridge the gap.” These provisions in joint and allied guidelines indicate that a node such as the proposed U.S. modular C<sup>2</sup> node is not only already an accepted practice, but operationally necessary.

Also, the establishment of a standing American C<sup>2</sup> node would preclude the need to establish *ad hoc* JTF organizations. Because of their contingency nature, both U.S. national and allied JTF are literally “thrown together in the heat of battle.”<sup>39</sup> In a rapidly developing crisis environment, joint task force staffs frequently spend precious time learning command relationships, staff procedures and individual position tasks. This adaptation to the staff “battle rhythm” may affect the staff’s ability to maintain a rapid operational tempo, and this inertia is compounded in the multinational environment. A standing American C<sup>2</sup> node would provide a ready, cohesive and trained staff organization for deployment within a NATO CJTF structure mentally and operationally ready for contingency missions.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly in combined operations, a standing American C<sup>2</sup> node embedded within a NATO CJTF structure would prove to be more politically

palatable to Allied partners than would alternative national C<sup>2</sup> structures. U.S. joint doctrine for multinational operations states that the key tenets of multinational cooperation are respect, rapport, knowledge and patience.<sup>40</sup> As stated, the co-establishment of a national JTF simultaneously with a multinational structure only serves to undermine harmonious relations with partner nations. However, contrary to the views of some opponents, many Allies do recognize the need for special U.S. only C<sup>2</sup> arrangements within allied military structures. Indeed, the United Kingdom recognizes that in the Kosovo operation "it is unsurprising that the contributors of over 80% of the firepower will take a dominant decision-making role. The UK or France would expect to do the same in similar circumstances."<sup>41</sup> Therefore, it seems clear that though allies view the establishment of full national JTFs as somewhat unacceptable, they do recognize the requirement for a U.S. C<sup>2</sup> node within an allied command structure. For this, a small, standing C<sup>2</sup> node, capable of modular deployment within the NATO CJTF structure would provide the United States with the operational and political responsiveness necessary for effective C<sup>2</sup> of American forces in multinational operations. The modular CINCEUR C<sup>2</sup> node would effectively bridge the gap between U.S. national and NATO C<sup>2</sup> structures.

It must be noted that not all American commanders consider NATO C<sup>2</sup> inadequate for the task of conducting contingency operations; LtGen Short holds the opposite view. When questioned whether the AFSOUTH staff could have handled the Kosovo operation without an additional U.S. C<sup>2</sup> structure, the General replied with an unequivocal, "Absolutely." However, when asked to elaborate, the General continued, "(The component commanders) didn't need Noble Anvil... we all had our U.S.-only nodes; we all had NICs."<sup>42</sup>

In the Kosovo operation additional U.S.-only C<sup>2</sup> nodes may not have been necessary.

Even without JTF Noble Anvil, 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet and 16<sup>th</sup> Air Force effectively provided the U.S.-only support required by CINCEUR. However, one must note that in the case of Operation Allied Force, both the Combined Joint Maritime Component Commander (CJMCC) and the CJFACC were dual-hatted American commanders, and this helped ease bridging the U.S./NATO C<sup>2</sup> gap. Were the functional commanders supplied by any other Allied nation, the information referred to by LtGen Short would not have been available. Additionally, the General's reference to the supporting NICs indicates that there was a requirement for U.S.-only support. As we have seen, a NIC would likely only fulfill a portion of this requirement. CINCEUR would clearly require a more robust U.S. national C<sup>2</sup> node.

## **Conclusion**

The United States has demonstrated its commitment to NATO operations throughout the Cold War and the subsequent period characterized by out-of-area operations in the Balkans Peninsula. Though the NATO military C<sup>2</sup> structure, particularly the NATO CJTF, is arguably the most formally defined in the history of multinational military operations, it is still lacking for the needs of the American commander. The United States has pledged to continue its efforts with multinational forces to streamline C<sup>2</sup> procedures to maximize effective coordination and operational C<sup>2</sup> of American forces. CINCEUR must establish a U.S. national modular C<sup>2</sup> node for deployment with a NATO CJTF in order to bridge the gap between the U.S. and NATO C<sup>2</sup> structures.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Michael E. Firlie, "A New Approach: NATO Standing Combined Joint Task Forces," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1999-2000): 32-33.

<sup>2</sup>Milan Vego, "On Operational Art (4<sup>th</sup> Draft)" (The United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, September 1999), 269.

<sup>3</sup>Robert W. RisCassi, "Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment: A Necessity," *Military Review* (Jan/Feb 1997): 111.

<sup>4</sup>Vago Muradian, "NATO Leaders to Unveil New Defense Cooperation Effort," *Defense Daily*, 26 April 1999, 1.

<sup>5</sup>Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report (Washington, D.C., 2000), 25.

<sup>6</sup>"DoD Releases Joint Vision 2020 Guidance Document," *Defense Daily*, 1 June 2000, 1.

<sup>7</sup>Department of Defense, 25.

<sup>8</sup>Col Patrick C. Sweeney, USA, former Dep CJ-5, AFSOUTH, interview by author, 2 February 2001, United States Naval War College, Newport

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>Select Committee on Defense, *Fourteenth Report: Lessons of Kosovo*, 1999, 4.

<sup>11</sup>RisCassi, 115.

<sup>12</sup>Sweeney.

<sup>13</sup>Select Committee on Defense, 7.

<sup>14</sup>Wesley K. Clark, "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead," *Parameters* (Winter 1999/2000): 5.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Pub 3-16 (Washington D.C., 2000), II-6.

<sup>17</sup>Department of Defense, 18.

<sup>18</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington

D.C., 1995), A-1.

<sup>19</sup>Select Committee on Defense, 8.

<sup>20</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0, A-2.

<sup>21</sup>Select Committee on Defense, 8.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>LtGen Michael Short, USAF (ret), interview by author, 9 January 2001, United States Naval War college, Newport.

<sup>25</sup>Department of Defense, Introductory Message.

<sup>26</sup>Select Committee on Defense, 7.

<sup>27</sup>Department of Defense, 20-21.

<sup>28</sup>Firlie, 33.

<sup>29</sup>NATO, "The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept." *NATO Fact Sheets*. 9 August 2000. <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm/> [7 January 2001].

<sup>30</sup>Firlie, 34.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>32</sup>Thomas Cooke, "NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emporer," *Parameters* (Winter 1998/1999): 125.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 130.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>35</sup>Firlie, 34.

<sup>36</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C<sup>4</sup>) Systems Support for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 6-0 (Washington D.C., 1995), GL-5.

<sup>37</sup>Cooke, 131.

<sup>38</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Pub 3-16,

II-7.

<sup>39</sup>Short.

<sup>40</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Pub 3-16,  
I-9.

<sup>41</sup>Select Committee on Defense, 7.

<sup>42</sup>Short.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Clark, Wesley K. "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead." *Parameters* (Winter 1999-2000): 2-14.
- Cooke, Thomas. "NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor." *Parameters* XXVII, No. 4 (Winter 1998-99): 124-136.
- DaSilva, Mario. "Combined Joint Task Force Concept: NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace." *Uithoorn* (1999): 150-155.
- Firle, Michael E. "NATO Standing Combined Joint Task Forces." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1999-2000): 32-35.
- NATO, "The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept." *NATO Fact Sheets*. 9 August 2000. <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm/> [7 January 2001].
- United Kingdom. Select Committee on Defense, *Fourteenth Report: Lessons of Kosovo*, 1999.
- RisCassi, Robert W. "Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment: A Necessity." *Military Review*, (Jan/Feb 1997): 103-114.
- Short, LtGen Michael, USAF (ret), Joint Force Air Component Commander. Interview by author, 9 January 2001, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
- Sweeney, Col Patrick C., USA, former Dep CJ-5, AFSOUTH, Interview by author, 2 February 2001, United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report* Washington, D.C: 2000.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Joint Operations. Joint Publication*. 3-0. Washington, D.C: 1 February 1995.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations. Joint Publication*. 3-16. Washington, D.C: 5 April 2000.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations*. 6-0. Washington, D.C: 30 May 1995.
- Vego, Milan. *On Operational Art (4<sup>th</sup> Draft)* Newport, Rhode Island: The United States Naval War College, 1999.